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Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and
computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. In the classical pure location Hotelling
game businesses compete for maximizing customer attraction by strategically locating their facilities,
assuming no price competition, while customers are attracted to their closest facilities. Surprisingly,
very little rigorous work has been presented on multi-unit facility location games, where the clas-
sical pure location Hotelling games are extended to contexts where each player is to locate several
facilities. In this paper we present two major contributions to the study of multi-unit pure location
Hotelling games. In the first part of this paper we deal with the two-player multi-unit setting, and
fully characterize its equilibria. In the second part of this paper we deal with multi-unit facility
location games, with N ≥ 3 players; our main result in this part is the full characterization of the
settings where pure strategy equilibria exist. Our results also extend classical results on necessary
and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be in equilibrium in a pure location (single-unit)
Hotelling game to multi-unit pure location games.
1. Introduction In his seminal work [9], Hotelling introduced a canonical model of com-
petition among businesses. In a classical motivating scenario Hotelling considered two ice-cream
vendors, who sell ice-cream to sunbathers on the beach, and wish to maximize their payoffs. The
vendors sell the same type of product, and charge the same price. Sunbathers are distributed uni-
formly along the beach and every sunbather walks to his/her nearest ice-cream vendor to buy an
ice-cream. As indicated by Hotelling, the vendors will strategically locate their ice-cream carts in
the middle of the beach, back to back, as this is the only Nash equilibrium of this game. Follow-
ing that seminal work, facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics,
operations research and computer science.
A natural extension of this location game is when players operate, and so must locate, several
facilities. In the above example, this corresponds to each ice-cream vendor running several stands
along the shore. Similar situations occur when coffee shop chains have to decide where to locate
stores in a newly created shopping strip in a big city. Surprisingly, very little rigorous work has
been published on such multi-unit facility location games although some exceptions are discussed
below.
In this paper we consider the multi-unit version of the pure location Hotelling game. The term
pure location is used to emphasize that the products and the prices offered by all players are identi-
cal, with the only difference relevant to the customer being their distances from the corresponding
facilities. In other words it assumes that players’ payoffs and customers’ choice are determined
solely by the location of the facilities and the customers. It is further assumed that customers will
visit the nearest facility.
Our model is mathematically formalized in Section 2, and can be briefly described as follows: we
consider a set of customers distributed on the [0,1] interval, and N players, where player i can locate
* In press. Preliminary version of this work appeared in The 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE
2016).
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2ni facilities on that interval. A customer is attracted to the nearest facility. The payoff of a player
is the expected number of customers attracted to her facilities. We consider a uniform distribution
of customers as in the original Hotelling setting and most extensions of pure location Hotelling
games. The case where ni = 1 for every i corresponds to the classical pure location Hotelling game.
Notice that due to the infinite action space, the existence of equilibrium is not immediate.
In Sections 3-4 we consider N = 2, the two-player game. We let player 1 locate l facilities and
player 2 locate k facilities, where l≤ k. We examine the optimization problem where a (monopoly)
player has to locate k facilities in a way that will minimize the expected absolute distance of cus-
tomers from their nearest facilities (called the social cost hereinafter), and highlight the importance
of these k-socially optimal locations. We show that if player 2 locates her facilities in the k-socially
optimal locations, and player 1 selects an l-tuple uniformly at random from these locations, equi-
librium is obtained. After proving the corresponding existence result in Section 3, in Section 4 the
equilibria are completely characterized and shown to all have the same structure. In particular,
our results imply that in any (possibly mixed) equilibrium, facilities are located in the k-socially
optimal locations only. Notice that this result is obtained although in all cases where the players
control a different number of facilities there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
In Section 5 we deal with the case of N ≥ 3. We generalize the known necessary and sufficient
conditions for a pure strategy profile to be in equilibrium (see [5]) in the classical (i.e. single-unit)
pure location Hotelling games. We then prove that a multi-unit facility location game possesses a
pure strategy equilibrium if and only if there is no dominant player – a player who controls more
than half of the facilities. We show that when a dominant player is present, there are conditions
under which a mixed equilibrium exist; the facilities are located in the positions that would have
been selected by the dominant player if she were a monopoly minimizing the social cost, generalizing
our finding for the two-player game.
Beyond their classical economic appeal, multi-unit facility location games are applicable to recent
data science contexts. This suggests a new motivation to the classical Hotelling setting and its
extension to the multi-unit scenario. These future directions will be discussed in Section 6.
1.1. Related Work An informative survey of facility location games literature up to 1992
appears in [2]. For a more recent survey the reader is referred to [4]. Many extensions of the above
basic Hotelling setting have been considered, although in most of the existing literature the set
of possible actions (i.e. possible facility locations) is very simple, e.g, a segment or a circle. For a
recent discussion of general graph structures in this setting see [8]. Within the literature related
to pure location Hotelling games little consideration has been given to players controlling several
facilities that need to be located in their actions. There are some exceptions, as we describe next.
The work of [17] considers the pure location competition between two players, who control more
than one facility, to be located on the [0,1] segment with uniform customer distribution. This is the
setting we consider when restricting the game to two players. While the paper does not discuss the
pure location game equilibrium, the author presents a minimax strategy for the dominant player
(who owns more facilities) while neglecting the analysis of the non-dominant player and the overall
simultaneous game. Notice that the existence of a minimax strategy for a player does not imply
the existence of equilibrium in infinite games. Indeed, our work is the first to show the existence
of equilibrium for this setting.
The work of [10] considers pure location Hotelling games, where a coalition of players may
collude. One may equate a colluding coalition to a player who owns several facilities. While most
of that work does not deal with equilibrium analysis, one of the results there [10, Proposition 6]
can be interpreted as showing mixed equilibria for some of the instances discussed in Lemma 11 of
this work. Note that most of our study on multiple player games is devoted to full characterization
of the situations where pure strategy equilibria exist.
3Pure location Hotelling games are closely related to Voronoi games (see e.g. [1, 6, 12]). In a
Voronoi game, players alternatingly place points in some space, and then every player gains the
total surface of the Voronoi cells of his points. In [1] the authors consider a two-player symmetric
game on the segment, where the players locate facilities alternatingly, and are not able to locate a
facility on an already occupied location. Our model is different, since a) we consider a simultaneous
game, b) we analyze the case of any number of players and c) players can locate facilities in the
same locations. In [1] the authors search for a sub-game perfect equilibria, whereas in our model
the game is simultaneous, and mixed strategy equilibria are the solution concept to be analyzed.
Few other works consider particular multi-stage facility location games with multiple units, in
settings vastly different from pure location Hotelling games and from the above extensions. In [14]
the authors study the sub-game perfect equilibria of a particular two-stage facility location, where
in stage one the firms choose the locations of their facilities, and in stage two the firms compete in
quantities as in a Cournot competition. It is interesting to note that in their setup n players with
m facilities each, will all locate their facilities in the monopoly socially-optimal locations. Hence,
there is a vast difference between their setup to pure location Hotelling games and our results,
where three or more facilities cannot be agglomerated in the same location in equilibrium. In [11]
the authors consider an elaborated two-firm three-stage model of facility location on a circle. The
firms select the number of facilities in the first stage, their locations in the second stage, and their
prices in the third stage. It is interesting to note that in their setup the locations selected by the
players in the second stage, in a sub-game perfect equilibrium, depend only on the number of
selected facilities. This is in sharp contrast to the results of our work, where the locations selected
by the non-dominant player depends on the number of facilities available to the dominant player.
2. Model and Preliminaries The non-cooperative game we consider is formally defined as
follows:
1. A continuous density function g over the unit interval [0,1], representing customer distribution.
2. A set of players [N ] = {1,2, . . . ,N}, where the (pure) strategy set of player i ∈ [N ] is Si =
{(s1i , s2i , . . . , snii )∈ [0,1]ni : s1i < s2i < · · ·< snii }. (ni)i∈[N ] are exogenously determined, and w.l.o.g.
we assume n1 ≤ n2 ≤ · · · ≤ nN . It will sometimes be convenient to say that player i has/owns a
facility in sji under si. A mixed strategy of every player i ∈ [N ] is an element of ∆(Si), which
is the set of all probability distributions over (Si,B(Si)), where B(Si) is the standard Borel
σ-algebra over Si.
3. Given a pure strategy profile s= (s1, . . . , sN)∈
∏N
i=1Si and t∈ [0,1], let
rt(s) =
{
i∈ [N ] : min
j
|t− sji | ≤min
i′,j′
|t− sj′i′ |
}
.
Namely, rt(s) is the set of players whose facilities are the closest to the customer t ∈ [0,1]. As
is standard, we assume that every customer is attracted to his nearest facility. The payoff of
player i under a pure strategy profile s is given by
ui(s) =
∫ 1
0
1i∈rt(s)
|rt(s)| g(t)dt,
and is extended to mixed strategy profiles x= (x1, . . . , xN)∈
∏
i∆(Si) by
ui(x) = E
s∼x
ui(s).
4In this paper, we focus on the uniform density function g, and refer to other cases in Section 6.
According to these assumptions, every game is fully described by the number of players and the
number of facilities of each player, i.e. G= (N, (ni)i∈N). 1
Equilibrium
For a vector v= (v1, . . . vn), we denote by v−i := (v1, . . . vi−1, vi+1, . . . vn) the vector that does not
contain the i-th coordinate of v.
A strategy profile s ∈∏i∈[N ]Si is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for every i ∈ [N ] and every
s′i ∈ Si it holds that ui(s′i, s−i)≤ ui(s).
Similarly, a mixed strategy profile x∈∏i∈[N ] ∆(Si) is a Nash equilibrium if for every i∈ [N ] and
every x′i ∈∆(Si) it holds that ui(x′i,x−i)≤ ui(x).
We say that xi ∈ ∆(Si) is a best response to x−i ∈
∏
j∈[N ]\{i}∆(Sj) if ui(xi,x−i) =
supx′i∈∆(Si) ui(x
′
i,x−i). It is well known that if xi is a best response to x−i, there exists a pure
strategy si ∈ Si such that si is a best response to x−i.
We say that player i has a beneficial deviation under a mixed strategy profile x = (xi,x−i) if
there exists x′i ∈∆(Si) such that ui(x′i,x−i)>ui(x).
Notations There exists a bijection from strategies (strictly increasing vectors) to sets, si 7→
∪j∈[ni]{sji}. Thus, for expositional simplicity, we refer to pure strategies as sets and as vectors
interchangeably. For instance, given a strategy si = (s
1
i , . . . , s
ni
i ), if there exists an index j such
that f = sji , we denote f ∈ si. In addition, if si = (f, s2i , . . . , snii ) and s′i = (f ′, s2i , . . . , snii ), it will be
comfortable to denote s′i = si \ {f}∪ {f ′}.
Notice that a player’s payoff is the total customer mass attracted to her facilities, or equivalently
the sum of customer mass attracted to each of her facilities. In this sense, facilities, even those
owned by the same player, are competing over customer mass. Accordingly, the customer mass
attracted to a facility of a player is determined by the other facilities’ locations only, and not by
their owners’ identities. To use this intuition in the upcoming analysis, we denote by
L(s) =∪i∈[N ]si
the set of locations selected by the players under the profile s. Given a pure strategy profile s and
a facility f ∈ si, let Vi(f ; s) denote the customer mass attracted to f ∈ si. Namely,
Vi(f ; s) =
{∫ 1
0
1|t−f |≤d(t,L(s))
|rt(s)| dt f ∈ si
0 otherwise
,
where d : 2[0,1]→ [0,1] is defined as d(t,A) = inff∈A |t− f |. Thus, an alternative representation of
player payoffs is ui(s) =
∑
f∈si Vi(f ; s).
Social cost In [9], Hotelling examines the transportation cost of a customer: the distance he
has to travel to reach his nearest facility. This notion is here referred to as the social cost.
Definition 1 (social cost). Given a finite set of locations A⊂ [0,1], the social cost is the
sum of distances customers must travel to reach their nearest facility. Formally, SC : 2[0,1]→ R≥0
is defined by
SC(A) =
∫ 1
0
d(t,A)dt.
1 We define the tie breaker as uniform selection among players (whose facilities are the closest to a customer) and not
as uniform selection among the facilities themselves. An additional modeling decision is forbidding a player to locate
two (or more) of her facilities in the same location. In fact, these two modeling decisions are taken for expositional
simplicity only: the four corresponding modeling options induce the same game after eliminating dominant strategies.
Breaking ties is relevant when two (or more) facilities are located in the same location, as otherwise it concerns a
zero-measure set of customers. If a player cannot locate two of her facilities in the same location, the two tie breakers
are equivalent (up to a zero-measure set). If a player is allowed to locate two of her facilities in the same location, it
is easy to verify that under both tie breakers such strategies are strictly dominated.
5The following proposition is a known result in the literature (see, e.g., [8]):
Proposition 1. Let ok =
{
ok1 , . . . , o
k
k
}
, where oki =
2i−1
2k
for i∈ [k]. It holds that
SC(ok) = inf
A⊂[0,1],|A|=k
SC(A).
For completeness, we present the proof in appendix A.1. We refer to the set ok as the k-socially
optimal locations. Observe that under the optimal locations, the customer mass served by each
facility is equal to 1
k
.
Notice that the social cost is a set function, and is influenced only by the locations in A⊂ [0,1].
Hence, one can extend the social cost to pure strategy profiles, by considering all locations selected
under the corresponding strategy profile, i.e.
SC(s) =
∫ 1
0
d (t,L(s))dt.
Analogously, the social cost of a mixed strategy profile is defined by SC(x) =Es∼xSC(s).
3. The Existence of an Equilibrium in Two-Player Games In this section we show the
existence of an equilibrium profile for two-player games. Consider G= (2, (l, k)). That is, N = 2,
player 1 has l facilities (n1 = l) and player 2 has k facilities (n2 = k), and w.l.o.g. let l ≤ k. For
brevity, we refer to two-player games as l vs k games.
3.1. Symmetric games We first analyze the special case of l = k, i.e. k vs k games. The
results for this symmetric game will be later used in our analysis of the general (asymmetric) case.
Observe that the k-socially optimal locations are available to both players as pure strategies. We
claim that each player can guarantee herself 1
2
by playing ok.
Proposition 2. For every s∈ S2 it holds that u2(ok, s)≤ 12 . 2
Proof. Fix an arbitrary strategy s∈ S2. For every f ∈ s exactly one of the following holds:
1. f ∈ [0, ok1)∪ (okk,1]. In this case, V2(f ;ok, s)< 12k .
2. f ∈ (okj , okj+1) for some 1≤ j < k; hence V2(f ;ok, s)≤ 12k .
3. f = okj for some j ∈ [k]. Since V1(okj ;ok, s) + V2(f ;ok, s) ≤ 1k and V1(okj ;ok, s) = V2(f ;ok, s), it
follows that V2(f ;ok, s)≤ 12k .
Therefore,
u2(o
k, s) =
∑
f∈s
V2(f ;ok, s)≤
∑
f∈s
1
2k
=
1
2
.

Lemma 1 below implies that there is a unique Nash equilibrium for k vs k games, which is
obtained when both players play ok. This is exploited later, when we consider asymmetric games.
Lemma 1. For every s∈ S2 such that s 6= ok, u2(ok, s)< 12 .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary strategy s ∈ S2 such that s 6= ok, and assume by contradiction that
u2(o
k, s) = 1
2
. According to Proposition 2, we conclude that
V2(f ;ok, s)≤ 1
2k
(1)
2 A similar observation appears in [17]. However, the model of [17] prohibits the players to agglomerate facilities;
hence modifications are needed.
6for all f ∈ s. Moreover, in order to have u2(ok, s) = 12 , Equation (1) must hold in equality; henceV2(f ;ok, s) = 12k for any f ∈ s. Denote
Ij =
[
okj , o
k
j+1
]
, 1≤ j < k,
and let I0 = [0, o
k
1), Ik = (o
k
k,1].
Step 1: Observe that no player 2 facility f ∈ s is located in I0, since if f ∈ I0, V2(f ;ok, s)< 12k , and
similarly for f ∈ Ik. Thus, all player 2’s facilities are located in ∪k−1i=1 Ii, i.e. |∪k−1i=1 Ii ∩ s|= k.
Step 2: If Ij contains exactly two facilities owned by player 2, i.e. |Ij ∩ s| = 2, it follows that
Ij ∩ s = {okj , okj+1}. To see this, denote these facilities by Ij ∩ s = {f1, f2} where w.l.o.g. f1 < f2.
Now:
• If okj < f1 < f2 < okj+1,
V2(f1;ok, s) =
f2− okj
2
<
okj+1− okj
2
=
1
2k
.
• If okj = f1 < f2 < okj+1, we have three cases: if j = 1, f1 = ok1 , then
V2(f1;ok, s) = f2 + o
k
1
4
<
ok2 + o
k
1
4
=
1
2k
,
and similarly for j = k. Alternatively, if 1< j < k, we have
V2(f1;ok, s) = 1
2
(
f2− okj−1
2
)
<
okj+1− okj−1
4
=
1
2k
.
A similar argument applies for the case where okj < f1 < f2 = o
k
j+1. Since V2(f1;ok, s) = 12k , we
conclude that okj = f1 < f2 = o
k
j+1.
Step 3: For every 1≤ j < k we have |Ij ∩ s|< 3. This is true since according to the previous step
every pair of facilities in Ij ∩ s should be located on different endpoints of Ij, which has only two
endpoints.
Step 4: Let
αopt = o
k ∩ s,αempt = ok \ s,αint = s \ ok.
Namely, αopt are the k-socially optimal locations occupied with player 2’s facilities under s; αempt
are the k-socially optimal locations free of player 2’s facilities under s; and αint are player 2’s
facilities which are located outside ok (interior points of I1, . . . Ik−1).
By definition, |αopt|+ |αempt|= |αopt|+ |αint|= k; therefore |αempt|= |αint|. Since s 6= ok, it follows
that |αopt| < k, and |αempt| = |αint| > 0. Due to Step 1, αint ∩ (I0 ∪ Ik) = ∅. Due to Steps 2 and
3, every facility in f ∈ (αint ∩ Ij) is the only facility of player 2 in Ij. Moreover, f ∈ (αint ∩ Ij)
implies that okj , o
k
j+1 ∈ αempt, i.e. the endpoints of Ij are not occupied with player 2’s facilities. Thus,
|αint| ≥ |αempt|+ 1, which yields the desired contradiction. We conclude that |αint| = |αempt| = 0,
and s= ok. 
Notice that u2(o
k, ok) = 1
2
, since both players choose the same locations. Hence, any strategy
profile (s1, s2) where s1 6= ok or s2 6= ok cannot be in equilibrium. This claim is extended to mixed
strategies as well: if x2 ∈ ∆(S2) assigns positive probability to strategies other than ok, then
u2(o
k, x2)<
1
2
, and by symmetry, the same argument holds for every x1 ∈∆(S1).
Corollary 1. In a k vs k game, the unique equilibrium is obtained when both players play
the k-socially optimal strategy.
Proof. If (x1, x2) ∈ ∆(S1) ×∆(S2) is an equilibrium profile, then u1(x1, x2) = u2(x1, x2) = 12
since otherwise the player who gets less can deviate to ok and guarantee herself 1
2
. In addition, if
Ps1∼x1 (s1 6= ok)> 0, Lemma 1 implies that Ps1∼x1
(
u2(s1, o
k)> 1
2
)
> 0; hence u2(x1, o
k)> 1
2
. There-
fore, player 1 chooses ok with probability 1 under x1, and symmetric argument applies for player
2. 
73.2. General two-player games Here we show the existence of an equilibrium profile for
the l vs k game. We denote ol,k for l≤ k the probability distribution that assigns probability 1/(kl)
to every subset of ok of size l. Formally:
Pol,k(s) =
{
1/(kl) if s⊆ ok, |s|= l
0 otherwise
.
Note that ol,k ∈∆(S1). We show that
Theorem 1. (ol,k, ok) is a Nash equilibrium of l vs k games.
Notice that u1(o
l,k, ok) = l
2k
and u2(o
l,k, ok) = 1− l
2k
. To prove Theorem 1, one must show that
none of the players has a beneficial deviation. This will be obtained using two supporting lemmas,
namely Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. For every s∈ S1 it holds that u1(s, ok)≤ l2k .
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2, and hence omitted. Since u1 (o
l,k, ok) = l
2k
, player
1 has no beneficial deviation.
In order to show that player 2 has no beneficial deviation, we exploit a connection between k vs
k games and l vs k games, in Lemma 3. In fact, we prove a slightly stronger claim than the lack of
beneficial deviation for player 2: we claim that if player 2 deviates from ok, her payoff will strictly
decrease.
Lemma 3. In an l vs k game, if s2 6= ok, it holds that u2(ol,k, s2)< 1− l2k .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary strategy s2 ∈ S2 of player 2 such that s2 6= ok. We have
u1(o
l,k, s2) =
∑
s1∈supp(ol,k)
u1(s1, s2)Pol,k(s1) =
∑
s1∈supp(ol,k)
k∑
i=1
(V1(oki ;s1, s2)Pol,k(s1)). (2)
Since for any s1 ∈ supp(ol,k) we know that s1 ⊆ ok, for every f ∈ s1 it follows that
V1(f ;s1, s2)≥V1(f ;ok, s2),
since the mass of customers for which the facility in f is the closest can only decrease. We derive
from Equation (2) that
u1(o
l,k, s2)≥
∑
s1∈supp(ol,k)
k∑
i=1
(
V1(oki ;ok, s2)Pol,k(s1)1oki ∈s1
)
=
k∑
i=1
V1(oki ;ok, s2)
l
k︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
s1∈supp(ol,k)
Pol,k(s1)1oki ∈s1 ,
where the last argument follows directly from the definition of ol,k. It follows that
u1(o
l,k, s2)≥ l
k
k∑
i=1
V1(oki ;ok, s2) =
l
k
u1(o
k, s2).
Notice that u1(o
k, s2) is the payoff of player 1 in the symmetric k vs k game under the strategy
profile (ok, s2). According to Lemma 1 it holds that u2(o
k, s2)<
1
2
, and since the game is fixed-sum,
u1(o
k, s2)>
1
2
, we can say u1(o
l,k, s2)>
1
2
l
k
= l
2k
. Finally,
u1(o
l,k, s2)>
l
2k
⇒ u2(ol,k, s2)< 1− l
2k
.

Overall, ok is the only best response of player 2 against ol,k.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that any change in player i’s strategy will not
improve her payoff; hence (ol,k, ok) is in equilibrium.
84. The Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-Player Games Here we show that under
any equilibrium of l vs k games, the realizable set of locations is the k-socially optimal locations
with probability 1. Namely, any equilibrium has the property that player 2 employs the strategy
ok, while player 1 uses some distribution over ok. This implies that player 1 does not contribute in
any equilibrium any new location, beyond what player 2 contributes, which are the locations that
correspond to the k-socially optimal ones.
When we refer to pure strategies or to “simple” mixed strategies, the players’ payoffs are easy to
compute. However, when one wishes to analyze an arbitrary mixed strategy profile, a few obstacles
arise. In order to address this, we employ a new point of view for the analysis.
Definition 2. Given a mixed strategy x ∈∆(S1), let µx(A) denote the expected number of
player 1’s facilities in the set A⊆ [0,1]. Formally,
µx(A) = E
(s11,s
2
1,...,s
l
1)∼x
(
l∑
i=1
1si1∈A
)
.
Observe that
Proposition 3. For every x∈∆(S1), the induced µx is a measure.
The proof is given in appendix A.2. Note that µx is the expected number of player 1’s facilities in
the set A under the strategy x, so for all x∈∆(S1) it follows that µx([0,1]) = l. Next, we use µ to
narrow the search for possible equilibrium strategies for player 1.
Definition 3. We say that a strategy x ∈ ∆(S1) is an (l, k)-socially optimal imitation, or
(l, k)-SOI for brevity, if
∀i∈ [k] : µx
({oki })= lk .
Note that being an (l, k)-SOI strategy implies that µx(o
k) = l; hence the support of any such
strategy is a subset of the discrete set{
(f1, . . . , fl) : ∀i∈ [l], fi ∈ ok
}
.
In particular, the previously defined ol,k is (l, k)-SOI, and ok is (k, k)-SOI. For some values of l and
k there may exist more than one (l, k)-SOI strategy. For instance,
x=
{(
1
8
, 3
8
)
w.p. 1
2(
5
8
, 7
8
)
w.p. 1
2
, y=
{(
1
8
, 7
8
)
w.p. 1
2(
3
8
, 5
8
)
w.p. 1
2
are two (2,4)-SOI strategies.
Although (l, k)-SOI strategies are not unique, they are quasi-unique, i.e. the measure in which
every location is selected will be identical in any (l, k)-SOI strategy. This fact will be useful later
in proving the quasi-uniqueness of equilibrium.
Notice the proof of Lemma 3 did not use specific properties of ol,k, apart from the fact that
µol,k ({oki }) = lk for all i∈ [k]. Therefore, the following is immediate from Lemma 3.
Corollary 2. Let x1 ∈∆(S1) be an (l, k)-SOI strategy of player 1. If s2 6= ok, it holds that
u2(x1, s2)< 1− l2k .
We now turn to analyze potential equilibrium profiles. A few properties should be satisfied under
any equilibrium profile for this setting.
Lemma 4. If (x1, x2)∈∆(S1)×∆(S2) is an equilibrium profile of an l vs k game, the following
assertions must hold:
1. u1(x1, x2) =
l
2k
, u2(x1, x2) = 1− l2k .
90
Step 1
1
ok1
2
1
ok2
2
0
ok3
2
0
okk
2
0
. . . . . .
0
Step 2
1
ok1
2
0
oki
2
0
oki+1
2
1
oki+2
2
0
okk
2
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1. The beneficial deviations constructed for Steps 1 and 2. Each circle represents a facility of player 2.
Consider the profile in Step 1, where we assume µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
2 ]
)
>µ
(
ok1
)
. The idea is to bracket facilities of player 1 inside
the interval (ok1 +1, o
k
2 +0), and make such facilities gain strictly less customer mass than under s2, while potentially
losing customer mass in the interval (0, ok1 + 1). Notice that the distance between every two facilities o
k
j , o
k
j+1 for
1< j < k remains as it was under s2.
2. µx1 ([0, o
k
1)) = µx1 ((o
k
k,1]) = 0.
3. u1(x1, x2) = u1(x1, o
k).
The proof of this lemma is deferred to appendix A.3. We are now ready to present the main result
of this section.
Theorem 2 (Quasi-Uniqueness of Equilibrium). In an l vs k game, a strategy profile
(x1, x2) is in equilibrium if and only if
C1: x1 is an (l, k)-SOI strategy, and
C2: x2 = o
k.
Proof. If C1,C2 are satisfied, Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 imply that neither of the players has
a beneficial deviation; hence (x1, x2) is in equilibrium.
For the other direction: assume (x1, x2) is an equilibrium strategy profile. In each of the following
steps, we exploit the fact that u2(x1, x2)≥ u2(x1, s2) for every s2 ∈ S2, or equivalently
u1(x1, s2)≥ u1(x1, x2) = l
2k
(3)
to obtain pieces of information about x1.
To simplify the notations in the upcoming analysis, we remove the subscript x1 from µx1 , since
x1 is clear from the context. Moreover, we use µ(f) instead of µ({f}) for f ∈ [0,1].
Step 1 : We argue that µ (ok1)≥ µ ((ok1 , ok2 ]). Assume by contradiction that µ ((ok1 , ok2 ])− µ (ok1) =
δ > 0. Consider
s2 =
(
ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0, . . . , o
k
k + 0
)
for small enough constants 1, 0 > 0 such that
3 µ (oki + j) = 0 for all i∈ [k], j ∈ {0,1} and
µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
1 + 1)
)
<
δ
6
, 0 <
δ1
2l
. (4)
Namely, s2 is similar to o
k, but every facility is shifted right by 0, except from the facility on o
k
1
which is shifted right by 1. See Figure 1 for illustration.
3 To justify the existence of such 0, 1, see Proposition 8 in the appendix. It should also be stated that 0, 1 <
1
2k
.
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Notice that for every s1 ∈ S1, player 1’s payoff satisfies
u1(s1, s2) =
∑
f∈s1
V1(f ;s1, s2)
=
∑
f∈[0,ok1 ]∩s1
V1(f ;s1, s2) +
∑
f∈(ok1 ,ok1+1)∩s1
V1(f ;s1, s2) +
∑
f∈[ok1+1,ok2+0]∩s1
V1(f ;s1, s2) +
∑
f∈(ok2+0,1]∩s1
V1(f ;s1, s2)
≤
∑
f∈[0,ok1 ]∩s1
(
1
2k
+
1
2
)
+
∑
f∈(ok1 ,ok1+1)∩s1
(
1
2k
+ 1
)
+
∑
f∈[ok1+1,ok2+0]∩s1
(
1
2k
+
0− 1
2
)
+
∑
f∈(ok2+0,1]∩s1
1
2k
. (5)
Taking expectation over Equation (5), we get
u1(x1, s2)≤ µ
(
[0, ok1 ]
)( 1
2k
+
1
2
)
+µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
1 + 1)
)( 1
2k
+ 1
)
+µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)( 1
2k
+
0− 1
2
)
+µ
(
(ok2 + 0,1]
) 1
2k
.
By additivity of µ, and due to µ ([0,1]) = l, we have
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
+
1
2
µ
(
[0, ok1 ]
)
+ 1µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
1 + 1)
)
+
0− 1
2
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)
.
Lemma 4 guarantees that there are no facilities owned by player 1 in [0, ok1) with probability 1,
namely µ ([0, ok1)) = 0; thus
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
+
1
2
µ
(
ok1
)
+ 1µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
1 + 1)
)
+
0− 1
2
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)
=
l
2k
− 1
2
(
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1)))+ 02 µ ([ok1 + 1, ok2 + 0]) .
≤ l
2k
− 1
2
(
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1)))+ l02 , (6)
where the last inequality is due to µ ([ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0])≤ µ ([0,1]) = l. Observe that
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1))≥ µ ([ok1 + 1, ok2 ])−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1))
= µ
(
(ok1 , o
k
2 ]
)−µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1))−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1))= µ ((ok1 , ok2 ])−µ (ok1)− 3µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1))
> δ− 3δ
6
=
δ
2
, (7)
where the last inequality follows from the contradiction assumption and Equation (4). Therefore,
by substituting Equation (7) into Equation (6), we get
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
− 1
2
(
µ
(
[ok1 + 1, o
k
2 + 0]
)−µ (ok1)− 2µ ((ok1 , ok1 + 1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
> δ2
+
l0
2
<
l
2k
− δ1
4
+
l0
2
Eq. (4)
<
l
2k
− δ1
4
+
l
2
δ1
2l
=
l
2k
.
Hence we obtain a contradiction to Equation (3), as player 2 has a beneficial deviation. We there-
fore conclude that µ (ok1)≥ µ ((ok1 , ok2 ]). By symmetry we also conclude that µ (okk)≥ µ
(
[okk−1, o
k
k
)
).
Step 2: We argue that for all 1≤ i≤ k− 2, µ ((oki , oki+1])≥ µ ((oki+1, oki+2]).4 Assume by contradic-
tion that µ
(
(oki+1, o
k
i+2]
)−µ ((oki , oki+1])= δ > 0 holds for some i. Consider
s2 =
(
ok1 + 0, . . . , o
k
i + 0, o
k
i+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0, . . . , o
k
k + 0
)
4 Step 2 is needed only if k≥ 3.
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for 1, 0 > 0 such that µ (o
k
i + j) = 0 for all i∈ [k], j ∈ {0,1} and
µ
(
(oki+1, o
k
i+1 + 1)
)
<
δ
4
, 0 <
δ1
4l
. (8)
Namely, s2 is similar to o
k, but every facility is shifted right by 0, except from the facility on o
k
i+1
which is shifted right by 1. See Figure 1 for illustration. With a construction similar to the one
given in Equation (5), we have
u1(s1, s2)≤ l
2k
+
∑
f∈[0,ok1)∩s1
0
2
+
∑
f∈[ok1 ,ok1+1)∩s1
0 +
∑
f∈(oki +0,oki+1+1)∩s1
1− 0
2
+
∑
f∈(oki+1+1,oki+2+0)∩s1
0− 1
2
. (9)
Taking expectation over Equation (9), we get
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
+
0
2
µ
(
[0, ok1)
)
+ 0µ
(
[ok1 , o
k
1 + 0)
)
+
1− 0
2
µ
(
(oki + 0, o
k
i+1 + 1)
)
+
0− 1
2
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
)
.
Lemma 4 guarantees that µ ([0, ok1)) = 0; thus
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
+ 0µ
(
[ok1 , o
k
1 + 0)
)
+
1− 0
2
µ
(
(oki + 0, o
k
i+1 + 1)
)
+
0− 1
2
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
)
≤ l
2k
− 1
2
(
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
)−µ ((oki + 0, oki+1 + 1)))+ l0, (10)
where the last inequality is due to
0
(
µ
(
[ok1 , o
k
1 + 0)
)− 1
2
µ
(
(oki + 0, o
k
i+1 + 1)
)
+
1
2
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
))≤ µ ([0,1]) 0 = l0.
Observe that
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
)−µ ((oki + 0, oki+1 + 1))≥ µ ((oki+1 + 1, oki+2))−µ ((oki , oki+1 + 1))
= µ
(
(oki+1, o
k
i+2]
)−µ ((oki+1, oki+1 + 1))−µ ((oki , oki+1])−µ ((oki+1, oki+1 + 1))
= µ
(
(oki+1, o
k
i+2]
)−µ ((oki , oki+1])− 2µ ((oki+1, oki+1 + 1))
> δ− 2δ
4
=
δ
2
, (11)
where the last inequality follows from the contradiction assumption and Equation (8). By substi-
tuting Equation (11) into Equation (10), we get
u1(x1, s2)≤ l
2k
− 1
2
(
µ
(
(oki+1 + 1, o
k
i+2 + 0)
)−µ ((oki + 0, oki+1 + 1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
> δ2
+l0
<
l
2k
− δ1
4
+ l0
Eq. (8)
<
l
2k
− δ1
4
+ l
δ1
4l
=
l
2k
,
Hence player 2 has a beneficial deviation, and we obtain a contradiction. Therefore, for all 1≤ i≤
k− 2 we have µ ((oki , oki+1])≥ µ ((oki+1, oki+2]). By symmetry, we further conclude that
∀1≤ i≤ k− 2 : µ ([oki , oki+1))≤ µ ([oki+1, oki+2)) .
Step 3: From Steps 1,2 and monotonicity of µ, we have
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• µ (ok1)≥ µ ((ok1 , ok2 ])≥ µ ((ok2 , ok3 ]) .....≥ µ
(
(okk−2, o
k
k−1]
)≥ µ ((okk−1, okk])≥ µ (okk)
• µ (ok1)≤ µ ([ok1 , ok2))≤ µ ([ok2 , ok3)) .....≤ µ
(
[okk−2, o
k
k−1)
)≤ µ ([okk−1, okk))≤ µ (okk)
Using the above inequalities we conclude that µ (oki ) =
l
k
for all i ∈ [k], i.e. x1 is (l, k)-SOI; hence
C1 is satisfied. From Corollary 2 we know that in case x2 6= ok, u2(x1, x2)< 1− l2k ; hence C2 is also
satisfied. 
Corollary 3 follows immediately from Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. In any equilibrium profile, facilities are materialized in ok with probability 1.
5. N Players In this section, we analyze N -player games with N > 2. We show that some
multi-unit games possess a pure Nash equilibrium, unlike (asymmetric) two-player games. First,
we show necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be in equilibrium, which provides full
characterization of the structure of equilibrium in case it exists. Then, we characterize the multi-
unit games which possess a pure equilibrium. Finally, we identify mixed strategy profiles for some
games that lack pure strategy equilibrium.
5.1. Notations for this section We hereby refer to pure location Hotelling games as single-
unit games, in the sense that for all i ∈ [N ] ni = 1, i.e. each player has a single facility. For
convenience, we denote n
def
=
∑N
i=1 ni. Also recall that L(s) =∪i∈[N ]si. For brevity, we often refer to
a facility located in f ∈ [0,1] simply as facility f .
Given a pure strategy profile s= (s1, . . . , sN), facilities located in min (L(s)) or in max(L(s)) are
referred to as peripheral facilities. A facility f owned by player i is called a lone facility if player i
is the only player that locates a facility in f under s, i.e. |{j ∈ [N ] : j 6= i, f ∈ sj}|= 0. Alternatively,
if |{j ∈ [N ] : j 6= i, f ∈ sj}|= 1, f is called a paired facility.
Facilities f1, f2 ∈L(s) are called neighbors if f1 6= f2 and (f1, f2)∩L(s) = ∅.5 fl ∈L(s) is called a
left neighbor of f ∈L(s) if fl < f and (fl, f)∩L(s) = ∅. In other words, fl ∈L(s) is a left neighbor
of f ∈ L(s) if fl is among the closest facilities to f from its left side. Analogously, fr ∈ L(s) is a
right neighbor of f ∈ L(s) if f < fr and (f, fr)∩L(s) = ∅. Note that there can be more than one
left/right neighbor to every f ∈L(s), and there may be none.
We denote by cr(f ; s) the quantity of customers traveling left in order to reach a facility (or
facilities) located in f ∈ [0,1]. Namely,
cr(f ; s) =
{∫ 1
f
1d(t,f)≤d(t,L(s))dt f ∈L(s)
0 otherwise
.
Similarly, cl(f ; s) denotes the quantity of customers traveling right in order to reach a facility (or
facilities) located in f ∈ [0,1],
cl(f ; s) =
{∫ f
0
1d(t,f)≤d(t,L(s))dt f ∈L(s)
0 otherwise
.
When analyzing a multi-unit game, we consider the following associated single-unit game:
Definition 4 (Flattened Game, Flattened Profile). Given a multi-unit game G =(
N, (ni)i∈[N ]
)
and a pure strategy profile s∈∏Ni=1Si,
• the flattened game of G, denoted G˜, is a single-unit game with n =∑Ni=1 ni players. That is,
G˜=
(
n, (1)i∈[n]
)
;
• a flattened profile of s is a pure strategy profile s˜ = (s˜1, . . . , s˜n) ∈ [0,1]n in the corresponding
flattened game G˜, where for every i∈ [N ], j ∈ [ni] there exists a unique k ∈ [n] such that s˜k = sji .6
5 Note that if f1, f2 are paired with each other, f1 is not a neighbor of f2 and vice versa.
6 Formally, there is a bijection M : {(i, j) : i∈ [N ], j ∈ [ni]}→ [n] such that sji = s˜M(i,j).
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We hereinafter use the tilde notations when referring to objects of flattened games and single-
unit games, while s and G refer to general multi-unit games. Note that G˜ is a symmetric game,
and several flattened profiles exist for every strategy of s, all of which are identical up to renaming
the players.
For example, let G= (2, (2,1)) and let s=
({ 1
4
, 3
4
},{ 1
2
}). It follows that G˜= (3, (1,1,1)), and two
flattened profiles of s are
(
1
4
, 3
4
, 1
2
)
and
(
3
4
, 1
4
, 1
2
)
.
5.2. Pure strategy equilibrium characterization The following result summarizes what
is known about pure equilibria in single-unit games (see, e.g., [7]).
Theorem 3. Let G˜=
(
N, (1)i∈[N ]
)
. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a pure strategy pro-
file s˜ to be in equilibrium are
1. The two peripheral (leftmost/rightmost) facilities are paired.
2. For all i∈ [N ] it holds that ui(s˜)≥maxf∈L(s˜),σ∈{l,r} cσ(f ; s˜).
In this subsection we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be in
equilibrium in a multi-unit game. Clearly, the conditions of Theorem 3 must be somehow taken into
account, since single-unit games are a special case of multi-unit games. We begin by showing that
the first condition of Theorem 3 is vital regardless of the number of facilities players can locate.
Proposition 4. If s is in equilibrium in G, then the peripheral facilities are paired.
Proof. W.l.o.g. let the leftmost facility fl be a lone facility of player i ∈ [N ], such that fl =
s1i ∈ si. Let f ′ ∈minL(s−i) be the leftmost facility of players other than i, and denote by sji the
left neighbor of f ′, which belongs to player i (possibly j = 1). For s′i ∈ Si such that
s′i = si \
{
sji
}∪{sji + f ′
2
}
,
it follows that ui(s)<ui(s
′
i, s−i); hence we obtain a contradiction to s being in equilibrium. 
Note that the second condition of Theorem 3 implies that if s˜ is a pure equilibrium of G˜, then
for every paired facility f ∈ L(s) it holds that cl(f ; s) = cr(f ; s). The following preposition shows
the same applies in multi-unit games.
Proposition 5. If s is in equilibrium in G, then for every paired facility f ∈L(s) it holds that
cl(f ; s) = cr(f ; s).
Proof. Let f ∈ si be a paired facility of player i, and w.l.o.g. let cl(f ; s)−cr(f ; s) =  > 0. Notice
that Vi(f ; s) = cl(f ;s)+cr(f ;s)2 . Consider
s′i = si \ {f}∪ {f − }.
If f has a left neighbor of player i under s, it follows that
ui(s
′
i, s−i) = ui(s)−Vi(f ; s) + cl(f ; s)−

2
= ui(s) +
1
2
(cl(f ; s)− cr(f ; s)− )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>ui(s).
Alternatively, if f has no left neighbor of player i under s, ui(s
′
i, s−i) is even greater. In both cases
player i has a beneficial deviation; hence s is not in equilibrium. 
The lemmas below will make use of the above propositions. While the previous two propositions
extended the conditions of Theorem 3 to multi-unit games, Lemma 5 analyzes a scenario which
can only occur if player(s) can locate more than one facility.
Lemma 5. If s is in equilibrium in G, then no lone facility has a neighbor owned by the same
player.
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Proof. First, assume that player i has two (or more) neighboring lone facilities. Denote by
sli, s
r
i the leftmost and rightmost lone facilities in a chain of neighboring lone facilities owned by
player i (possibly r = l + 1, i.e. the length of the chain is two). Proposition 4 implies that sli, s
r
i
are not peripheral. Let (fl, fr) be the smallest interval such that fl, fr ∈L(s−i) and sli, sri ∈ (fl, fr).
Observe that
s′i = si \ {sli, sri}∪
{
fl + s
l
i
2
,
sri + fr
2
}
is a beneficial deviation for player i, which cannot occur if s is an equilibrium profile. This is true
even if player i owns facilities in fl and/or fr. Thus, there are no neighboring lone facilities owned
by the same player.
Alternatively, denote by sji a lone facility owned by player i, and let s
j+1
i be its right paired
neighbor (symmetric for left neighbor). Here again, Proposition 4 suggests that sji is not peripheral.
There are two possible sub-cases:
1. If the left neighbor(s) of sji is (are) not owned by player i, a beneficial deviation can be con-
structed by shifting the facility in sji to the left.
2. If sj−1i ∈ si is a left neighbor of sji , then sj−1i ∈ si must be paired (according to the previous
case). Let
s′i = si \ {sj−1i , sji , sj+1i }∪
{
, sj−1i +

2
, sj+1i −

2
}
for  such that 0< < fl = min(L(s)). Due to Proposition 5, it holds that cl(sj−1i ; s) = cr(sj−1i ; s)
and cl(s
j+1
i ; s) = cr(s
j+1
i ; s). Therefore,
Vi
(
sj−1i +

2
;s′i, s−i
)
+Vi
(
sj+1i −

2
;s′i, s−i
)
= cr(s
j−1
i ; s) + cl(s
j+1
i ; s)−

2
Prop.5
= Vi(sj−1i ; s) +Vi(sji ; s) +Vi(sj+1i ; s)−

2
. (12)
Moreover, notice that
Vi (;s′i, s−i) +Vi
(
s1i ;s
′
i, s−i
)≥Vi (;s′i, s−i) +Vi(s1i ; s)− fl + 4 = Vi(s1i ; s) + fl + 4
fl>
> Vi(s1i ; s) +

2
. (13)
By combining Equations (12) and (13), we get
Vi
(
sj−1i +

2
;s′i, s−i
)
+Vi
(
sj+1i −

2
;s′i, s−i
)
+Vi (;s′i, s−i) +Vi
(
s1i ;s
′
i, s−i
)
> Vi(sj−1i ; s) +Vi(sji ; s) +Vi(sj+1i ; s) +Vi(s1i ; s).
Finally, Vi(f ;s′i, s−i) = Vi(f ; s) for every f ∈ si \ {s1i , sj−1i , sji , sj+1i }; thus
ui(s
′
i, s−i) =
∑
f∈s′i
Vi(f ;s′i, s−i)>
∑
f∈si
Vi(f ; s) = ui(s),
and s′i is a beneficial deviation for player i.
Overall, we showed that in equilibrium a lone facility cannot have a neighbor owned by the same
player. 
At this point, we link multi-unit games and their auxiliary single-unit games. We claim that a
profile s can be in equilibrium in G only if s˜ is an equilibrium profile of G˜.
Lemma 6. If s is in equilibrium in G, then s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜.
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Proof. Assume by contraposition that s˜ is not in equilibrium in G˜, so at least one of the
conditions of Theorem 3 does not hold. By Proposition 4 the peripheral facilities of s are paired;
hence by definition in the flattened profile the peripheral facilities of s˜ are paired as well.
Therefore, there exists i′ ∈ [n] such that
q= ui′(s˜)< max
σ∈{l,r},f ′∈L(s˜)
cσ(f
′; s˜) = p.
Let i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [ni] such that s˜i′ = sji , and denote by (l, f) a maximum point of cσ(f ′; s˜), i.e.
cl(f ; s˜) = p (similar analysis applies if cσ(f
′; s˜) attains its maximum only for σ = r). In addition,
observe that ui′(s˜) = Vi(sji ; s). There are three possible cases:
1. If f /∈ si, for
s′i = si \ {sji}∪ {f − }
where  > 0 is a small enough constant we obtain ui(s
′
i, s−i)>ui(s).
2. f ∈ si is a lone facility owned by player i. It follows from Proposition 4 and Lemma 5 that f is
not peripheral and has no neighbor owned by player i. Hence, f has right and left neighbors,
fr, fl respectively, such that
Vi(f ; s) = fr− fl
2
= p.
Let s′i ∈ Si such that
s′i = si \ {sji , f}∪ {fl + , fr− }
for  > 0, and notice that for every f ′ ∈ si ∩ s′i it holds that Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i)≥Vi(f ′; s). Therefore,
ui(s
′
i, s−i)≥ ui(s)− (q+ p) + 2p−  > ui(s)
for small enough .
3. f ∈ si is paired. By Proposition 5 cl(f ; s) = cr(f ; s) = p/2. Let s′i ∈ Si such that
s′i = si \ {sji , f}∪ {f − , f + },
for  > 0. We shall analyze the worst case scenario for player i, when f ’s neighbors belong also
to player i. It holds that
ui(s
′
i, s−i)≥ ui(s)− − (q+ p) + 2p−  > ui(s).
In all cases player i has a beneficial deviation; therefore we obtain contradiction since s is not an
equilibrium in G. 
The following lemma addresses another scenario which may occur only in multi-unit games.
Lemma 7. If s is in equilibrium in G, then all the facilities owned by the same player attract
the same customer mass.7 Formally,
∀i∈ [N ],∀f, f ′ ∈ si : Vi(f ; s) = Vi(f ′; s). (14)
Proof. Assume by contraposition that s is an equilibrium profile, and the condition set in
Equation (14) does not hold. Therefore, there exists a player i whose facilities are located in
f, f ′ ∈ si such that
Vi(f ; s)−Vi(f ′; s) =  > 0.
7 Facilities owned by different players, however, can attract different customer mass.
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If the facility located in f is lone under s, it follows from Proposition 4 that it is not peripheral,
and from Lemma 5 that its neighbors, denoted fl and fr, do not belong to player i. For s
′
i =
si \ {f, f ′}∪ {fl + 2 , fr− 2}, it holds that
ui(s
′
i, s−i) = ui(s)−Vi(f ; s)−Vi(f ′; s) +Vi
(
fl +

2
;s′i, s−i
)
+Vi
(
fr− 
2
;s′i, s−i
)
= ui(s)−Vi(f ; s)−Vi(f ′; s) + 2Vi(f ; s)− 
2
= ui +

2
.
Hence s′i is a beneficial deviation of player i.
Alternatively, if the facility located in f is paired, it does not have lone neighbors belonging to
player i under s. Further, from Proposition 5 it follows that cl(f ; s) = cr(f ; s) = Vi(f ; s). Denote
s′i = si \ {f, f ′}∪ {f − δ, f + δ} for δ > 0. Observe that
Vi(f − δ;s′i, s−i) +Vi(f + δ;s′i, s−i) = cl(f ; s) + cr(f ; s)− δ.
In addition, ∑
f ′′∈s′i∩si
Vi(f ′′;s′i, s−i)≥
∑
f ′′∈s′i∩si
Vi(f ′′; s)− δ
2
,
with equality in the case that the facility located in f does not have any neighbors belonging to
player i under s. Overall,
ui(s
′
i, s−i) =
∑
f ′′∈s′i
Vi(f ′′;s′i, s−i)≥
∑
f ′′∈s′i∩si
Vi(f ′′; s)− δ
2
+ cl(f ; s) + cr(f ; s)− δ
=
∑
f ′′∈s′i∩si
Vi(f ′′; s) + 2Vi(f ; s)− 3δ
2
=
∑
f ′′∈si
Vi(f ′′; s) + − 3δ
2
= ui(s) + − 3δ
2
.
For δ < 2
3
, we conclude that s′i is a beneficial deviation of player i. Hence, we obtained a contra-
diction to s being in equilibrium.

We deduce from Lemmas 5,6,7 three necessary conditions that must hold in every equilibrium
profile. The following lemma shows that these conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient.
Lemma 8. If under a strategy profile s
• no lone facility has a neighbor of the same player;
• all the facilities owned by the same player attract the same customer mass; and
• s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜,
then s is in equilibrium in G.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that s is not in equilibrium in G, and player i has a beneficial
deviation. Observe that∑
f∈si∩s′i
Vi(f ; s) +
∑
f∈si\s′i
Vi(f ; s) = ui(s)<ui(s′i, s−i) =
∑
f∈s′i∩si
Vi(f ;s′i, s−i) +
∑
f ′∈s′i\si
Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i). (15)
For every f ∈ si ∩ s′i, it holds that Vi(f ;s′i, s−i)≤Vi(f ; s), since f has no lone neighbors of player i
under s. Summing over all the elements of si ∩ s′i, we get∑
f∈si∩s′i
Vi(f ;s′i, s−i)≤
∑
f∈si∩s′i
Vi(f ; s). (16)
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From Equations (15) and (16) it follows that∑
f∈si\s′i
Vi(f ; s)<
∑
f ′∈s′i\si
Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i).
Notice that |s′i \ si|= |si \ s′i|. Therefore, there exist f ∈ si \ s′i, f ′ ∈ s′i \ si such that
Vi(f ; s)< Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i). (17)
Let i′ be an index of a player in G˜ such that s˜i′ = f . Recall that s˜= (s˜1, . . . s˜n) is in equilibrium in
G˜; hence f ′ is not a beneficial deviation for player i′, i.e. Vi′ (f ′;f ′, s˜−i′)≤Vi′ (f ; s˜). Thus,
Vi(f ′;si \ {f}∪ {f ′}, s−i)≤Vi(f ; s). (18)
Equations (17),(18) imply that
Vi(f ′;si \ {f}∪ {f ′}, s−i)< Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i). (19)
We proceed by showing that Equation (19) cannot hold, which will contradict the assumption
of player i having a beneficial deviation. Let (fl, fr) be the smallest interval such that f
′ ∈ (fl, fr)
and fl, fr ∈ L (s−i) ∪ {0,1}. Notice that fl, fr do not depend on si. Since player i does not have
two neighboring lone facilities under s, we know that |si ∩ (fl, fr)| ≤ 1. In addition, |si ∩ (fl, fr)|=
0 cannot hold, since otherwise we would have Vi(f ′;si \ {f} ∪ {f ′}, s−i) = Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i), which
contradicts Equation (19).
Therefore, |si ∩ (fl, fr)| = 1. Denote this facility f∗ ∈ si ∩ (fl, fr), and w.l.o.g. assume f ′ < f∗
(f ′ > f and f ′ = f are analyzed similarly). The means of choosing fl and fr ensure that player i’s
facility in f∗ is lone under si. Now,
• If f∗ ∈ s′i, it follows that
Vi(f ′;si \ {f}∪ {f ′}, s−i) = f
∗− fl
2
≥Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i),
which contradicts Equation (19).
• Otherwise, if f∗ /∈ s′i, it holds that
Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i)≤
fr− fl
2
= Vi(f∗; s), (20)
with equality if f ′ is the only facility owned by player i under s′i inside (fl, fr). From the second
condition of this lemma we know that Vi(f ; s) = Vi(f∗; s). By combining this fact with Equations
(17) and (20), we get
Vi(f ; s)< Vi(f ′;s′i, s−i)≤
fr− fl
2
= Vi(f∗; s) = Vi(f ; s),
which yields a contradiction.
We conclude that players do not have beneficial deviations under s, indicating that s is an equi-
librium profile. 
By gathering the results obtained in Lemmas 5-8, one concludes that
Theorem 4. In a multi-unit game G, necessary and sufficient conditions for a pure strategy
profile s to be in equilibrium are:
1. No lone facility has a neighboring facility of the same player under s.
2. All the facilities owned by the same player attract the same customer mass.
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Figure 2. Four pure strategy profiles for G= (4, (1,1,2,2)). Circles represent the chosen locations of the players; for
example player 1 has a lone facility in 3
7
in profile s(1), lone facility in 5
8
in profile s(2), paired facility in 6
7
in profile s(3)
and paired facility in 1
7
in s(4). Observe that flattened profiles of all the above are in equilibrium in the flattened game
G˜. Profiles s(1) and s(2) are in equilibrium, while s(3) and s(4) are not. First, notice that the conditions of Lemma 8
are met under s(1) and s(2). On the other hand, s(3) is not in equilibrium since the lone facility of player 3 in 3
7
has a
neighbor of hers in 1
7
. While u3(s
(3)) = 5
14
, in case she deviates to s′3 =
(
1
7
+ , 4
7
− ) her payoff is u3(s′3, s(3)−3) = 37 − .
Under s(4), it holds that 1
7
= V3( 67 ; s(4)) < V3( 37 ; s(4)) = 1.57 ; thus condition 2 of Lemma 8 is not satisfied. Here too
s′3 =
(
1
7
+ , 4
7
− ) is a beneficial deviation for player 3.
3. s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜.
Proof. One direction follows from Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, while the other direction follows from
Lemma 8. 
Figure 2 illustrates two equilibrium profiles (s(1) and s(2)) and two profiles which are not in
equilibrium for the game G= (4, (1,1,2,2)). Note that infinite equilibria exist for this game, and
can be obtained not only by swapping facilities between the players (while preserving the necessary
and sufficient conditions), but also by modifying the set of locations.
5.3. Pure strategy equilibrium existence Until now, we focused on determining if a profile
is an equilibrium for a specific game, and only eluded determining whether a game possesses a
pure equilibrium or not. In this subsection, we classify the set of games possessing pure equilibria.
Recall that our two-player analysis showed that if one of the players owns more facilities than
the other, there is no pure equilibrium. The following notion extends this idea of dominance to
multiple players. We remind the reader that we assume w.l.o.g. n1 ≤ n2 ≤ · · · ≤ nN , and that the
total number of facilities is denoted by n, i.e. n=
∑N
i=1 ni.
Definition 5 (Dominant Player). In a multi-unit game, player N is called a dominant
player if she owns more than half of all facilities, i.e.
N−1∑
i=1
ni <nN .
Before we deal with any general n, note that possible multi-unit games with n≤ 3 are:
1. G= (2, (1,1)), which is a single-unit game with two players. As studied in [9], the only equilib-
rium of this game is obtained for the pure strategy profile
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
.
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2. G= (2, (1,2)), which is an instance of a two-player game with l= n1 = 1, k= n2 = 2. As indicated
in the previous section, this game has no pure equilibrium.
3. G= (3, (1,1,1)), namely a single-unit game with three players. This is known to have no pure
equilibrium (see [5]), but mixed equilibrium does exist (as studied in [16]).
Leaving these games aside, it turns out that knowledge on the existence of a dominant player
is the only property necessary for determining the existence or absence of a pure equilibrium in
a multi-unit game. The following result is in accordance with the results of the previous section,
which implied that if n1 <n2 in a two-player game, there is no pure equilibrium.
Theorem 5. In a multi-unit game G with n≥ 4, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium if and
only if it has no dominant player.
The proof of Theorem 5 relies on several supporting claims. Proposition 6 shows that if a dominant
player exists, there is no pure equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Let G be a multi-unit game with n ≥ 4. If player N is a dominant player,
then there is no pure equilibrium.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that player N is a dominant player and s is a pure strategy
equilibrium of G. Since nN >n−nN , there are facilities owned by player N which are lone. Let p
denote the number of lone facilities player N owns under s. According to Theorem 4, a lone facility
owned by player N cannot have a neighbor which also belongs to her, and cannot be peripheral.
Thus,
|{f : i∈ [N − 1], f ∈ si, f has a lone neighbor of player i}| ≥ p+ 1.
In addition, player N has nN − p paired facilities. Therefore
|{f : i∈ [N − 1], f ∈ si, f is paired with f ′ ∈ sN}|= nN − p.
Overall, we conclude that the number of facilities is at least
p+ (p+ 1) + 2(nN − p) = 2nN + 1>n,
which yields the desired contradiction. 
Proving the other direction of Theorem 5, namely that there exists at least one pure strategy
equilibrium for every game with a dominant player, is of a different flavor and deserves a different
treatment. We divide the class of all multi-unit games into two sub-classes: even and odd n, for
reasons that will become apparent. We first deal with the case of an even number of facilities.
Lemma 9. Let G be a multi-unit game with n≥ 4 where player N is not dominant. If n is even,
then there exists a pure equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by (fk)
n
k=1 the sequence
∀k ∈ [n] : fk =
2(k (mod n
2
))− 1
n
.
Notice that fk = fk+n2 for every k ≤ n2 , and if i ≤ n2 , i 6= k then fi 6= fk. Therefore, the sequence
contains n
2
pairs of identical elements, and each pair is different than the other pairs. Now, we
allocate f1, . . . fn1 to player 1, fn1+1, . . . , fn1+n2 to player 2 and so on. Namely,
si =
(
f∑i−1
k=1
ni+1
, f∑i−1
k=1
ni+2
, . . . , f∑i
k=1 ni
)
.
Denote s = (s1, . . . , sN). For every k ≤ n2 , the sub-sequence (fk, fk+1, . . . , fk+n2−1, fk+n2 ) contains
n
2
+ 1 elements; therefore, fk and fk+n2 are owned by different players, since there is no dominant
player. Every facility attracts the same customer mass under s, players do not have lone facilities
and s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜; therefore, Theorem 4 implies that s is in equilibrium. 
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Constructing a pure equilibrium for games with an even n is straightforward, as indicated by
Lemma 9 above. However, if n is odd, there cannot be a profile where all facilities are paired;
thus, there must be at least one lone facility. Recall that every equilibrium profile should also be in
equilibrium in the corresponding flattened game. In Proposition 7 below we identify two constraints
on the equilibrium structure.
Proposition 7. Let G be a multi-unit game. If a profile s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜, then
1. Players who own paired facilities obtain the same payoff.
2. If a player owns a lone facility with paired neighbors, she gets a strictly higher payoff than
players who own paired facilities.
Proof. To prove the first claim, recall that if player i (in the flattened game) owns a paired
facility in f , then ui(s˜) =
cr(f ;s˜)+cl(f ;s˜)
2
. In addition, cr(f ; s˜) = cl(f ; s˜) holds in equilibrium, since
otherwise player i has a beneficial deviation. Now, due to the second condition of Theorem 3, for
every facility f ′ owned by player i′ it holds that
ui(s˜)≥ max
f ′′∈L(s˜),σ∈{l,r}
cσ(f
′′; s˜)≥ cr(f ′; s˜) = ui′(s˜), ui′(s˜)≥ max
f ′′∈L(s˜),σ∈{l,r}
cσ(f
′′; s˜)≥ cr(f ; s˜) = ui(s˜).
Thus, ui(s˜) = u′i(s˜).
We move to the second claim. Let f, f ′ be a lone facility and one of its neighboring paired facilities,
owned by players i and i′ respectively. Assume w.l.o.g. that f < f ′. Since s˜ is in equilibrium,
cr(f
′; s˜) = cl(f ′; s˜); thus ui′(s˜) = cl(f ′; s˜). Due to symmetry, cr(f ; s˜) = cl(f ′; s˜). Since f is lone it is
not peripheral; thus cl(f ; s˜)> 0, and we have ui(s˜)> cr(f ; s˜) = ui′(s˜). 
Proposition 7 establishes two important constraints on the structure of equilibrium profiles in
multi-unit games. First, assume that a player owns a lone facility with paired neighbors. Notice
that all of her facilities must be lone as well: this is true since all the paired facilities attract the
same customer mass, which is strictly less than that lone facility. Second, assume that a player
owns both lone and paired facilities. If a lone facility of hers has paired neighbors (of other players),
it obtains a strictly higher customer mass than what they obtain. Therefore, her lone facilities
cannot have paired neighbors.
We shall use these two constraints in the construction of equilibrium profiles for odd n. While
relatively simple equilibria exist for specific game instances, we are interested in a one-fits-all
equilibrium structure. We are now ready to construct an equilibrium profile for multi-unit games
with odd n.
Lemma 10. Let G be a multi-unit game with n ≥ 5 where player N is not dominant. If n is
odd, then there exists a pure equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the lemma by constructing a pure equilibrium profile s for G, where all
the facilities owned by player 1 are lone. The construction is done in steps, where in each step
we sequentially locate a subset of all the facilities, and then allocate them to players. We will
also present a visual snapshot of the [0,1] segment after each step, where 1 represents a facility
allocated to player 1, and empty circles represent facilities of players 2, . . .N − 1. Finally, we
show that the profile s we constructed indeed satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4, and hence in
equilibrium. Denote p= 1
n+1
.
Step 1: we locate the left peripheral facilities in p. We allocate these facilities to players N and
N − 1. The current snapshot is
0 p
p
1
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Step 2: We define the sequence (f lonei )
2n1−1
i=1 such that
f lonei =
{
(i+ 2)p if i is odd
(i+ 1)p+ ip
n1
if i is even
.
We allocate (f lonei )
2n1−1
i=1 in the following manner:
• For i= 1 to 2n1− 1:
— If i is odd, assign f lonei to player 1.
— Otherwise, define the number of player j’s remaining facilities to be nj minus those allocated
to her in Step 1 and iterations 1, . . . i−1. Assign f lonei to the player with the highest number
of remaining facilities, breaking ties by selecting the player with the lowest index.
Notice that the customer mass attracted to each even-indexed facility is p. The current snapshot
is
0 p
p 2p
1
3p
2p
n1
2p− 2pn1
1
5p
4p
n1
. . .
2p
n1
1
2n1p+ p 1
Step 3: So far we located and allocated (2n1− 1) + 2 facilities, which is an odd number. Thus,
since n is odd, there is an even number of facilities we did not locate yet. Denote by (0, n′2, . . . n
′
N)
the number of remaining facilities of each player after the previous step.
Claim 1. There is no dominant player in (n′2, . . . n
′
N).
The proof contains a case analysis, and is deferred to the appendix. We define the sequence
(fpairi )
n−(2n1+1)
i=1 such that
fpairi = 2n1p+ 3p+ 2p
⌊
i− 1
2
⌋
.
Using a similar argument to the one given in Lemma 9, we can allocate (fpairi )
n−(2n1+1)
i=1 such that
each pair contains facilities of different players. Notice that the rightmost facility is located in
fpairn−(2n1+1) = 2n1p+ 3p+ 2p
⌊
n− 2n1− 2
2
⌋
= 2n1p+ 3p+ p(n− 2n1− 3) = np= n
n+ 1
.
The current snapshot is
0 p
p 2p
1
3p
2p
n1
2p− 2pn1
1
5p
4p
n1
. . .
2p
n1
1
2n1p+ p
2p
2pn1 + 3p
. . .
2p
n
n+1
p
1
Step 4: We have located all n facilities: two in Step 1; 2n1 − 1 in Step 2; and the remaining
n− (2n1 +1) in Step 3. We also allocated these facilities to the players such that each player i owns
ni facilities; thus s is a valid profile of G. We now show that the conditions of Theorem 4 hold for
s:
1. Due to Step 2, every lone facility is either owned by player 1 and has neighbors of players
2, . . .N , or owned by a player 2, . . .N and has neighboring facilities of player 1 only.
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Figure 3. Mixed equilibrium for the game (4, (1,1,4)). Player 3, a dominant player, selects o4 =
{
1
8
, 3
8
, 5
8
, 7
8
}
deter-
ministically. Player 1 selects 1
8
with probability half, and 3
8
with probability half. Player 3 selects 5
8
with probability
half, and 5
8
with probability half. The payoff of players 1 and 2 is 1
8
each, while player 3 gets 3
4
. Note the resemblance
to the quasi-unique equilibrium profile of the two-player game (2, (2,4)).
2. Due to Steps 1 and 3, all paired facilities obtain a customer mass of p. In addition, the con-
struction in Step 2 assures that
• for every odd index i,1≤ i < 2n1− 1, it holds that f lonei+2 − f lonei = 2p;
• for every even index i,2≤ i < 2n1, it holds that f lonei+2 − f lonei = 2p+ 2pn1 ; and• cl(f lone1 ; s) + cr(f lone1 ; s) = cl(f lone2n1−1; s) + cr(f lone2n1−1; s) = 2p+ 2pn1 .
Therefore, every lone facility of players 2, . . .N attracts a customer mass of exactly p as well
(recall that these were even-indexed facilities in the sequence (f lonei )
2n1−1
i=1 , and each lies in a
segment of length 2p, from which it gets half). In addition, facilities owned by player 1 get
p(1 + 1
n1
) each (each lies in a segment of length 2p+ 2p
n1
, from which it gets half). Hence, for
every i∈ [N ], player i’s facilities all attract the same customer mass.
3. In Step 3 we located (and allocated) at least one pair of facilities: since N ≥ 3 and n≥ 5 we
have n≥ 3n1 > 2n1 + 1. Hence, Steps 1 and 3 ensure that the left and right peripheral facilities
are paired. Moreover, every player in the flattened game obtains a customer mass of at least p,
and
p= max
f∈L(s˜),σ∈{l,r}
cσ(f ; s˜);
hence no player in the flattened game has a beneficial deviation. It follows from Theorem 3 that
s˜ is in equilibrium in G˜.
Overall, s is an equilibrium profile for G. 
To conclude this subsection, notice that Theorem 5 follows immediately from Proposition 6 and
Lemmas 9 and 10.
5.4. Mixed equilibria We now show that the principles we relied upon in the previous
sections for the analysis of two-player games may lead to constructing mixed equilibrium for some
games with a dominant player. The key ingredient is that the strategies of players 1,2, . . . ,N − 1
together mimic a
(∑N−1
i=1 ni, nN
)
-SOI strategy, as will be formally described next.
Lemma 11. Let G=
(
N, (ni)i∈[N ]
)
be a multi-unit game with a dominant player. If there exist
constants b1, b2, . . . , bN−1 ∈N>0 such that
• ∑N−1i=1 bi = nN ; and
• for all i∈ [N − 1] it holds that ni
bi
= n−nN
nN
then G possesses a mixed equilibrium.
Proof. We shall describe a mixed strategy profile x, and show that players do not have prof-
itable deviations. Let onN = {onN1 , onN2 . . . onNnN } as defined in Section 3. Since
∑N−1
i=1 bi = nN , there
exists a partition of onN , B1,B2, . . . ,BN−1, such that |Bi|= bi. For i ∈ [N − 1], let xi ∈∆(Si) such
that
Pxi(s) =
{
1/(bini) if s⊆Bi, |s|= ni
0 otherwise
.
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We argue that x = (x1, . . . , xN−1, onN ) is in equilibrium. First, observe that for every s−N ∈
supp (x−N), it holds that L(s−N)⊂ onN . Hence, for every i ∈ [N − 1], s−i ∈ supp (x−i), si ∈ Si and
f ∈ si it follows that
Vi(f ;si, s−i)≤ 1
2nN
.
This implies for all si ∈ Si, ui(si,x−i)≤ ni2nN = ui(x). We are therefore left to show that player N has
no beneficial deviation. Assume by contradiction that there exists s′N ∈ SN such that uN(s′N ,x−N)>
uN(x) = 1−
∑N−1
i=1 ni
2nN
. Define an auxiliary two-player game
G′ =
(
2,
(
N−1∑
i=1
ni, nN
))
,
with players 1′ and 2′. Notice that SN (in G) is equal to S2′ (in G′), and that x−N ∈∆(S1′). By
the way we constructed xi for i∈ [N − 1], it holds that
Psi∼xi
(
oji ∈ si
)
=
{
ni
bi
oji ∈Bi
0 otherwise
.
Since ni
bi
= n−nN
nN
and (Bi)
N−1
i=1 is a partition of o
nN , it follows that
∀j ∈ [nN ] : Ps−N∼x−N
(
onNj ∈L(s−N)
)
=
n−nN
nN
=
∑N−1
i=1 ni
nN
.
Hence x−N is a
(∑N−1
i=1 ni, nN
)
-SOI strategy of player 1′ in G′. Recall that Corollary 2 implies that
∀sN ∈ SN : u2′(x−N , sN) =
∑
s−N∈supp(x−N )
∑
f∈sN
V2′ (f ; s−N , sN)≤ 1−
∑N−1
i=1 ni
2nN
, (21)
while the contradiction assumption implies
1−
∑N−1
i=1 ni
2nN
<uN(x−N , s
′
N) =
∑
s−N∈supp(x−N )
∑
f∈s′
N
V2′ (f ; s−N , s′N) . (22)
By using Equations (21) and (22) we get
1−
∑N−1
i=1 ni
2nN
<
∑
s−N∈supp(x−N )
∑
f∈s′
N
V2′ (f ; s−N , s′N)≤ 1−
∑N−1
i=1 ni
2nN
;
hence a contradiction is obtained. Therefore, player N has no beneficial deviation in x, thereby
concluding the proof of Lemma 11. 
Figure 3 visualizes a mixed equilibrium for G= (4, (1,1,4)). As described in the Introduction, [10,
Proposition 6] indicates the existence of mixed equilibria for the class of games {G= (N, (ni)i∈[N ])}
for which ni = 1 for i ∈ [N − 1], and there exists k ∈N>1 such that nN = k(n− nN). Indeed, such
games are a special case of those characterized in Lemma 11, where bi = k for all i∈ [N − 1].
In the proof of Lemma 11 we used the fact that x−N =
∏
i∈[N−1] xi was a
(∑N−1
i=1 ni, nN
)
-SOI
strategy. Clearly, one can come up with strategies for players 1,2, . . .N − 1 such that the joint
strategy x−N will be a
(∑N−1
i=1 ni, nN
)
-SOI strategy, even without the lemma’s conditions, by
setting xi to be a (ni, nN)-SOI strategy. However, note that this is not enough, since unless the
conditions of the lemma are met, with positive probability two “weak” players will position a
facility in the same location. Thus, with positive probability, three facilities will be located at the
same point, and so these players have beneficial deviations. Such a profile cannot be in equilibrium.
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(a)
Bi-Modal Distribution
(b)
Symmetric Beta Distribution
Figure 4. Examples of non-uniform distributions. In (a), the suggested profile will be in equilibrium, as both of the
players have no profitable deviations. In (b), however, player 1 can deviate to q1/2 and increase her payoff.
6. Discussion and Future Work We have presented a natural extension of pure location
Hotelling games. For the case of two players, we showed the existence and quasi-uniqueness of
equilibrium, where the strong player acts according to the socially optimal facility locations, and
the weak player is mixing between subsets of the strong player’s locations. Afterwards, for multi-
player games, we extended the necessary and sufficient conditions required for a pure strategy
profile to be in equilibrium in Hotelling games to the multi-unit setting. We characterized the set
of games possessing pure equilibrium, and identified mixed equilibria for a large class of games
which do not possess a pure equilibrium. The existence of equilibrium profiles for any such game,
even under uniform distribution, is left as an open question.
Another direction to investigate is what happens when the customer distribution g is not uniform,
as studied in [13] for the single-unit Hotelling game.
Consider a two-player game with n1 = 1, n2 = 2. Let qa be the a-th quantile of g, namely
qa = inf
{
t∗ ∈ (−∞,∞) : a≤
∫ t∗
−∞
g(t)dt
}
.
A simple generalization of the equilibrium profile introduced in Section 3 is (x1, x2), where
x1 =
{
q1/4 w.p.
1
2
q3/4 w.p.
1
2
, x2 = (q1/4, q3/4).
If g is Bi-Modal, it can be easily shown that the profile above is in fact in equilibrium. However, in
case g is the Symmetric Beta Distribution, the suggested profile is not in equilibrium, since player 1
would prefer choosing q1/2 rather than mixing between q1/4 and q3/4. See Figure 4 for a visualization
of this. We leave the question of equilibrium existence and structure in multi-unit facility location
games under non-uniform distribution open as well.
Beyond the classical motivation of these games indicated in the introduction, new motivating
scenarios in areas related to Data Science, such as Machine Learning, Advertising and Information
Retrieval are emerging. Consider the following illustrative scenario. The readers of an on-line
newspaper can be modeled as points on the [0,1] segment, where the point p ∈ [0,1] captures a
reader with a desire for proportion p of news and (1−p) of editorials in a newspaper. The decision
of a publisher is on the mix between news and editorials he will choose in his newspaper in order to
attract as many readers as possible. A major aspect of on-line newspapers is that one may maintain
several versions. This brings us into the context of multi-unit facility location games. Interestingly,
recent work in data science [15] has shown the applicability of this approach in modeling realistic
competition among publishers.
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Appendix A: Omitted Proofs:
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 Let A= {a1, . . . , ak}, and w.l.o.g. a1 ≤ · · · ≤ ak. For simplicity,
denote a0 = 0, ak+1 = 1. For i∈ [k+ 1], we let
bi = ai− ai−1.
Note that
∑k+1
i=1 bi = 1. It follows that
SC(A) =
∫ 1
0
min
a∈A
d(t, a)dt
=
∫ a1
a0=0
(a1− t)dt+
k∑
i=2
∫ ai
ai−1
min{t− ai−1, ai− t}dt+
∫ ak+1=1
ak
(t− ai−1)dt. (23)
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Observe that
∫ a1
a0
(a1− t)dt= b
2
1
2
, and
∫ ak+1
ak
(t− ai−1)dt= b
2
k+1
2
. In addition, for i∈ {2, . . . , k} it holds
that ∫ ai
ai−1
min{t− ai−1, ai− t}dt= b
2
i
4
.
Therefore, Equation (23) can be rewritten as
SC(A) =
b21
2
+
b2k+1
2
+
k∑
i=2
b2i
4
. (24)
To find the minimum of SC(A), one must constrain (bi)i∈[k+1] to satisfy
∑k+1
i=1 bi = 1. To do so, we
define a new function and incorporate Lagrange Multipliers (see e.g. [3]):
h (b1, . . . , bk+1, λ) =
b21
2
+
b2k+1
2
+
k∑
i=2
b2i
4
+λ
(
k+1∑
i=1
bi− 1
)
.
By assigning zeros to the partial derivatives of h, we get its minimum point:
bi =
{
1
2k
i∈ {1, k+ 1}
1
k
i∈ {2,3..k} .
Finally, since bi = ai− ai−1, we obtain A=
(
1
2k
, . . . , 2i−1
2k
, . . . , 2k−1
2k
)
. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3. Fix x∈∆(S1). For every set A⊆ [0,1], let
Ai = [0,1]
i−1×A× [0,1]l−i.
Thus, an equivalent formulation of µx is
µx(A) =
∫
[0,1]l
l∑
i=1
1Aidx.
In order to show that µ is a measure, we need to show that it satisfies non-negativity, null empty
set and countable additivity:
1. Non-negativity: ∀A⊆ [0,1], it follows that 1Ai ≥ 0; thus µx(A)≥ 0.
2. Null empty set: if A= ∅, it follows that Ai = ∅ for all 1≤ i≤ l. Since 1∅ ≡ 0, µx(∅) = 0.
3. Countable additivity: for disjoint sets (Bj)∞j=1,
µx
( ∞⋃
·
j=1
Bj
)
=
∫
[0,1]l
l∑
i=1
1⋃·∞j=1Bjdx=
∫
[0,1]l
l∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
1
B
j
i
dx
Fubini’s Thm.
=
∞∑
j=1
∫
[0,1]l
l∑
i=1
1
B
j
i
dx
=
∞∑
j=1
µx(B
j).

Proposition 8. For any strategy x1 of player 1 the following holds:
1. For any 0≤ a< b≤ 1, there exists  > 0 such that a+  < b and µ (a+ ) = 0.
2. For any a∈ [0,1) and δ > 0, there exists  > 0 such that µ ((a,a+ ))< δ.
Proof.
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1. Assume by contradiction that for any  such that 0 <  < b − a it holds that µ (a+ ) > 0.
Observe that [
b− a
4
,
b− a
2
]
⊂ (0, b− a)
is closed and µ is bounded, µ obtains a minimum point inside it,
c= min
y∈[ b−a4 , b−a2 ]
µ (a+ y).
The contradiction assumption implies that c > 0; thus
µ
([
b− a
4
,
b− a
2
])
≥
∞∑
n=1
µ
(
b− a
4
(
1 +
1
n
))
≥
∞∑
n=1
c=∞.
However, µ
([
b−a
4
, b−a
2
])≤ µ ([0,1]) = l; hence a contradiction is obtained.
2. Define a decreasing sequence of sets (Bi)
∞
i=1, Bi ∈B([0,1]) such that
Bi =
(
a,a+
1
n0 + i
)
,
where n0 is the minimal integer satisfying a+
1
n0
≤ 1. Since Bi decreases to ∅ and µ is a measure,
we know that limi→∞ µ (Bi) = µ (∅) = 0. Therefore, there exists j such that
µ (Bj) = µ
(
a,a+
1
n0 + j
)
< δ.
Hence we denote = 1
n0+j
and the claim holds.

A.3. Proof of Lemma 4.
1. The assertion is a property of fixed-sum games. In particular, recall that Lemma 2 implies that
u1(o
l,k, x2)≥ l2k for any x2 ∈∆(S2); thus in case player 1 gets less, she can deviate to ol,k. A
similar argument applies for player 2.
2. If µx1 ([0, o
k
1)) > 0, with positive probability a facility owned by player 1 is realized in [0, o
k
1);
hence
Ps1∼x1
(
∃f ∈ s1 : V1(f ;s1, ok)< 1
2k
)
> 0.
Recall that Lemma 2 implies that V1(f ;s1, ok) ≤ 12k for every s1 ∈ S1 and every f ∈ s1; thus
together we have
u1(x1, o
k) =Es1∼x1u1(s1, o
k) =Es1∼x1
(∑
f∈s1
V1(f ;s1, ok)
)
<
l
2k
.
Obviously, if x2 = o
k we obtain a contradiction to part one of this lemma. Alternatively, if
x2 6= ok it follows that (x1, x2) is not an equilibrium, since u2(x1, ok) > 1 − l2k and therefore
player 2 has a beneficial deviation. We conclude that µx1 ([0, o
k
1)) = 0, and by similar arguments
we have µx1 ((o
k
k,1]) = 0.
3. By Lemma 2, u1(x1, o
k)≤ l
2k
, and when combined with part one of this lemma we get u1(x1, o
k)≤
u1(x1, x2). In addition, if u1(x1, o
k)<u1(x1, x2) then u2(x1, o
k)>u2(x1, x2); hence (x1, x2) is not
an equilibrium.

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A.4. Proof of Claim 1. Let j∗ be the index of the player with the highest number of facilities
(if two or more players own the highest number of facilities under (n′2, . . . n
′
N), there is no dominant
player). We have two possible cases:
1. If j∗ <N : since initially nj∗ ≤ nN and the tie breaker is inclined towards low indices, it follows
from the construction that n′j∗ = n
′
N + 1. Since n
′
j∗ + n
′
N is odd while
∑N
j=2 n
′
j is even, there
exist at least one more player, denoted by i, with n′i ≥ 1. Hence
n′j∗ = n
′
N + 1≤ n′N +n′i ≤
N∑
j=2,j 6=j∗
n′j,
and player j∗ is not a dominant player.
2. If j∗ =N , we separate the analysis into two cases:
(a) If during Step 2 we did not allocate facilities to players 2, . . . ,N −1, then exactly n1 facilities
owned by player N are allocated by the end of Step 2. In addition, n1 + 1 facilities of players
2, . . .N − 1 are allocated by the end of Step 2. Hence,
nN −n1 <
N−1∑
j=1
nj −n1⇒ n′N = nN −n1 ≤
N−1∑
j=1
nj −n1− 1 =
N−1∑
j=2
n′j.
(b) Otherwise, let i∗ denote the latest iteration a facility was allocated to a player with index
from 2, . . . ,N − 1, and denote by k the index of this player. It follows that before iteration
i∗ player k had n′k + 1 facilities. In addition, after iteration i
∗ facilities were only allocated
to player N ; thus n′N ≤ n′k + 1. Since n′N > n′k (recall that j∗ = N), we have n′N = n′k + 1.
Notice that n′N +n
′
k is odd while
∑N
j=2 n
′
j is even; thus there exists at least one more player,
denoted by i, with n′i ≥ 1. Hence
n′N = n
′
k + 1≤ n′k +n′i ≤
N−1∑
j=2
n′j.
Overall, we showed that there is no dominant player in (n′2, . . . n
′
N), which concludes the proof of
this claim. 
